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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1894 in McKane v. Durston,1 a unanimous United States
Supreme Court concluded that no matter how grave the offense,
a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to appeal.'
Since the common law failed to recognize an absolute right to
appeal, it followed that review by an appellate court was "not a
necessary element of due process of law."' Justice Harlan found
this principle to be so self-evident that "[a] citation of authori-
ties upon the point is unnecessary."4
Nearly ninety years later, a majority of the Court appeared
to reaffirm the holding of McKane by stating bluntly: "There is,
of course, no constitutional right to an appeal . . . ." This
statement did not pass unchallenged, however. Justice Black-
mun in a concurring opinion found it unnecessary to decide"whether there is or is not a constitutional right to a first appeal
of a criminal conviction."' Justice Brennan, in his dissenting
opinion, observed that the majority's statement rejecting the
concept of a constitutional right to an appeal was not only
unnecessary to the decision but was also arguably wrong.7 If the
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J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley, 1978.
This Article is dedicated to my colleagues at the Washington Appellate Defender
Association.
1. 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
2. Id. at 687.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983). See also Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) (Supreme Court allowed plaintiff to appeal the denial of a pre-
trial motion solely on the ground that such an appeal met statutory requirements, not
because of a right to appeal).
6. Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3314 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 3315 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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issue were to come directly before the Supreme Court, Brennan
concluded, McKane would probably be overruled, and the Court"would decide that a State must afford at least some opportu-
nity for review of convictions, whether through the familiar
mechanism of appeal or through some form of collateral
proceeding."8
Since today virtually every state recognizes a right to appeal
in "significant criminal cases," premised upon either a statute or
a court rule, a case presenting the issue of whether the right to
appeal is guaranteed by the federal Constitution is, as Justice
Brennan observed, "unlikely to arise."9 Thus, one may ask,
"What difference does it make whether the right to appeal a
criminal conviction is of constitutional magnitude?" In this Arti-
cle, I will demonstrate that it makes a significant difference.
The framers of the Washington State Constitution believed
that it made a difference, for they expressly included the right to
appeal from a criminal conviction in article I, section 22 of the
Declaration of Rights. ° In 1889 Washington thus became the
first state in the nation to constitutionalize explicitly the right to
appeal in criminal cases. Since that time six more states have
amended their constitutions to include a specific guarantee of
the right to appeal in criminal cases. Utah11 and Arizona1"
adopted provisions nearly identical to article I, section 22 of the
Washington Constitution. The constitutional provisions of Mich-
igan, ' 3 Louisiana, 4 Nebraska, 5 and New Mexico"6 are worded
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 provides in part: "In criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall have . . . the right to appeal in all cases. ... The Washington Constitu-
tion became effective on Nov. 11, 1889, the date of Washington's admission to the Union.
11. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12 provides in part: "In criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right . . . to appeal in all cases."
12. Aaiz. CONST. art. II, § 24 provides: "In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have . . . the right to appeal in all cases .... "
13. MicH. CONST. of 1908, art. II, § 19 provided: "In every criminal prosecution, the
accused shall have the right. . . to have such reasonable assistance as may be necessary
to perfect and prosecute an appeal." The Michigan Constitution adopted in 1963 con-
tains an identically worded guarantee of the right to appeal. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 20.
14. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 19 provides:
No person shall be subjected to imprisonment or forfeiture of rights or prop-
erty without the right of judicial review based upon a complete record of all
evidence upon which the judgment is based. This right may be intelligently
waived. The cost of transcribing the record shall be paid as provided by law.
15. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 23 provides: "In all cases of felony the defendant shall have
the right of appeal to the Supreme Court; and in capital cases such appeal shall operate
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somewhat differently. Three other states, Wisconsin, 7 West Vir-
ginia,18 and Florida,"9 have recognized a constitutional right to
appeal in criminal cases through the process of judicial interpre-
tation of less explicit clauses of their state constitutions.
The many consequences of "constitutionalizing" the right to
appeal become evident only when one answers certain underly-
ing questions about the nature of an appeal. What are the essen-
tial elements of an appeal? Why should we view the criminal
defendant's right to appeal as an element of due process of law?
Part II of this Article seeks to develop a theoretical due process
as a supersedeas to stay the execution of the sentence of death, until further order of the
Supreme Court."
16. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 2 provides:
Appeals from a judgment of the district court imposing a sentence of death or
life imprisonment shall be taken directly to the supreme court. In all other
cases, criminal and civil, the supreme court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction
as may be provided by law; provided that an aggrieved party shall have an
absolute right to one appeal.
17. WIs. CoNs. art. I, § 21 provides in part: "[WIrits of error shall never be prohib-
ited, and shall be issued by such courts as the legislature designates by law." See Scheid
v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 575, 853a [sic], 211 N.W.2d 458, 462 (1973) (per curiam) (the Wis-
consin Supreme Court held that under art. I, § 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution there is
a constitutional right to appeal in criminal cases that were appealable at the time the
original 1848 state constitution was adopted), overruled on other grounds, State v. Van
Duyse, 66 Wis. 2d 286, 224 N.W.2d 603 (1975).
18. The West Virginia Supreme Court has derived a state constitutional right to
appeal from its state constitution's due process clause, W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 10, and
from W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 17, which provides: "The courts of this State shall be open,
and every person, for an injury done to him, in his person, property or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law; and justice shall be administered without sale, denial,
or delay." See Rhodes v. Leverette, 239 S.E.2d 136, 139 (W. Va. 1977) (indigent criminal
defendant has a right to appeal conviction); State ex rel. Johnson v. McKenzie, 226
S.E.2d 721, 724 (W. Va. 1976) (constitutional due process requires that a convicted
defendant be furnished a transcript pursuant to the right of appeal); State ex rel.
Bratcher v. Cooke, 188 S.E.2d 769, 770 (W. Va. 1972) (denial of an appeal by convicted
defendant violates due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions, rendering
the sentence void and unenforceable).
19. Compare FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(1) (appeal may be taken as a matter of right
from final judgments or orders of trial courts) with former FLA. CONST. of 1956, art. V, §
3 (appeals may be taken as a matter of right from judgments imposing the death pen-
alty, judgments passing directly on the validity of state and federal statutes and federal
treaties, judgments passing directly on the state or federal constitutions, and from final
judgments for validation of bonds and certificates of indebtedness). See also Crownover
v. Shannon, 170 So. 2d 299, 301 (Fla. 1964) (the right to appeal from final judgments of
trial courts has become a part of the Florida Constitution); State v. J.P.W., 433 So. 2d
616, 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (state has a constitutional right of appeal from judg-
ments in juvenile cases). The holding in J.P.W. was met with disagreement in several
subsequent cases. Mays v. State, 450 So. 2d 299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); State v. J.H.,
450 So. 2d 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); State v. A.M., 449 So. 2d 282 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); State v. C.C., 449 So. 2d 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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framework for use in deciding when the right to appeal under
article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution has been
unconstitutionally abridged or denied. Part III contains an
analysis of oral argument as an essential element of the right to
appeal. Finally, parts IV through VII discuss some of the possi-
ble consequences flowing from the constitutionalization of the
right to appeal in criminal cases.
II. A DUE PROCESS FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES
A. The Common-Law Background
In Griffin v. Illinois,20 Justice Frankfurter observed that
neither the common law nor national historical experience lends
any support to the contention that "due process of law" should
be construed as including a right to appeal in criminal cases.
[N]either the unfolding content of "due process" nor the par-
ticularized safeguards of the Bill of Rights disregard proce-
dural ways that reflect a national historic policy. It is signifi-
cant that no appeals from convictions in the federal courts
were afforded . . . for nearly a hundred years; and, despite the
civilized standards of criminal justice in modern England,
there was no appeal from convictions . . . until 1907. Thus, it
is now settled that due process of law does not require a State
to afford review of criminal judgments.2'
To Frankfurter, the right to appeal failed to qualify as an ele-
ment of due process because it lacked a common-law pedigree
and was only a relatively recent creation of statutory law.22
No right of appeal existed at common law.23 The right,
when recognized, was strictly of civil-law origin.24 At common
20. 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
21. Id. at 21 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
22. In 1889 Congress first permitted appeals as a matter of right in all federal crimi-
nal cases in which a sentence of death had been imposed. Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, §
6, 25 Stat. 656. A general right of appeal in federal criminal cases was not statutorily
created until 1911. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 240, 36 Stat. 1157.
23. See, e.g., Robinson v. Clements, 409 S.W.2d 215, 218 (Mo. 1966) (right of appeal
conferred solely by statute); Fromm v. Sutton, 156 Neb. 411, 414, 56 N.W.2d 441, 443
(1953) (appellate jurisdiction can be conferred only in the manner provided by statute);
Hager v. Weber, 7 N.J. 201, 206, 81 A.2d 155, 157 (1951) (appeals from judgments at law
are unknown to the common law); Warren v. City of Cincinnati, 113 Ohio App. 254, 255,
173 N.E.2d 180, 181 (1959) (at common law the right to appeal was unknown).
24. See Buessel v. United States, 258 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir. 1919) (an appeal is a
process of civil-law origin and was used to review errors of fact and law, as opposed to a
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law, review of a trial court judgment of conviction could be
obtained only if a defendant successfully petitioned for a "writ
of error. '2 5 The critical difference between the civil-law right to
an appeal and a common-law writ of error was that review was
discretionary under the common-law procedure, but mandatory
under the civil law. At the Washington State Constitutional
Convention of 1889, the seven members of the Committee on the
Constitutional Preamble and Bill of Rights, who drafted the
Declaration of Rights, presumably were aware that there was no
existing common-law right to appeal.2" Perhaps they knew that
earlier that year Congress had, for the first time, created a statu-
tory right to appeal in federal criminal cases when a sentence of
death was imposed.27
The committee submitted a draft Declaration of Rights to
the convention on July 25, 1889, which contained the provision
in article I, section 22 guaranteeing all criminal defendants an
absolute right to appeal.2" Although the committee studied three
proposed constitutional models when drafting article I, section
22, the right to appeal in criminal cases did not devolve from
any of them.29 Thus, it can be inferred that the idea of constitu-
tionalizing the right to appeal in criminal cases originated in the
United States with this committee of seven, charged with the
task of defining the inalienable natural rights of citizens of their
state.
The Washington Supreme Court has suggested that an
examination of "[tihe central principles of the common law" is
an appropriate aid to state constitutional interpretation.3 0 By
writ of error, the common-law counterpart, which was used only to remedy errors of law).
25. See, e.g., A. CARTER, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH COURTS 58 (7th ed. 1944); G.
CRAB, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 185 (1929); 1 S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 244-45 (7th ed. 1956); L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 22-31 (1939); T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 202-03 (4th ed. 1948); 2 F. POL-
LOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 668 (2d ed. 1959).
26. See THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1889
at 491 (B. Rosenow ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as JOURNAL]. The committee members
were C.H. Warner (Chair), Gwin Hicks (Secretary), George Comegys, Francis Henry,
Lewis Sohns, J.C. Kellog, and Frank M. Dallam. Of the seven, only Francis Henry had
served previously as a delegate to the Walla Walla Constitutional Convention of 1878.
27. Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 656.
28. JOURNAL, supra note 26, at 155-56.
29. The committee studied the Oregon Constitution of 1857, art. I, § 11; the Indiana
Constitution of 1851, art. I, § 13; and the Hill Proposed Washington Constitution, art. I,
§ 11. See JOURNAL, supra note 26, at 511 n.37. None of these proposed constitutional
provisions mentioned a right to appeal from a judgment of conviction.
30. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 691, 674 P.2d 1240, 1243 (1983).
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interpreting our state constitutional provisions in a manner"consistent with their common law beginnings," the courts can
best achieve the intentions of the framers. 1 But with respect to
the right to appeal, there are no "common law beginnings" and
no applicable "central principles of common law." The provision
in article I, section 22 granting a constitutional right to appeal in
all criminal cases marks a sharp break with the common-law
past. Consequently, proper judicial interpretation of the scope of
the constitutional right to appeal must reflect the framers'
intention to transform a discretionary privilege into an absolute
right.2 Recognition of the historical background of the right to
appeal, therefore, leads to the conclusion that the framers would
have been vigorously opposed to any attempt, either legislative
or judicial, to restrict a convicted defendant's right to appeal or
to diminish the scope of appellate review.
B. Modern Procedural Due Process and the Right to Appeal
in Criminal Cases
The modern judicial test for assessing the requirements of
procedural due process, imposed upon the states by the four-
teenth amendment, calls for a balancing of three distinct factors:
(1) the private interest affected by the government's action; (2)
the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest if the procedural
safeguard were absent; and (3) the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that the procedural safeguard would impose upon the gov-
ernment.33 This formulation of the test of procedural due pro-
cess necessarily implies that procedural due process "is not a
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances."34 "[D]ue process is flexible," the
Supreme Court tells us, "and calls for such procedural protec-
tions as the particular situation demands. 35
31. Id. at 699, 674 P.2d at 1247.
32. See State v. Schoel, 54 Wash. 2d 388, 392, 341 P.2d 481, 483 (1959) ("It is true
that under the Federal constitution, appellate review is a privilege; however, the tenth
amendment of the constitution of this state guarantees a 'right to [sic] appeal in all
cases.' In re Woods v. Rhay, [54 Wash. 2d 36, 41], 338 P.2d 332, 336 (1959).").
33. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See also Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 6 (1981); Ingra-
ham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977).
34. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 493 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
35. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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Applying the three-factor test of procedural due process to
the "particular situation" of a convicted criminal defendant, one
must first ask: What is the nature of the "private interests" at
stake? In In re Winship,3 6 the Supreme Court recognized that
"[t]he accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake inter-
ests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that
he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the cer-
tainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.""a The
key question, then, is whether the risk of erroneously incarcerat-
ing and stigmatizing the innocent justifies the administrative
and financial burdens imposed on government by recognizing an
absolute right to appeal in all criminal cases.
In Winship, although the three-part procedural due process
test of Mathews v. Eldridges had yet to be articulated, the risk
of erroneous deprivation was the key to the Court's decision to
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile delinquency
adjudications. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Winship is a clear
harbinger of the Mathews procedural due process test. As Jus-
tice Harlan wrote, the procedural safeguard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is required by the due process clause because a
lesser standard would pose "a smaller risk of factual errors that
result in freeing guilty persons, but a far greater risk of factual
errors that result in convicting the innocent. ' 39 In the context of
a criminal case, courts "do not view the social disutility of con-
victing an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of acquit-
ting someone who is guilty."4 ° Harlan concluded that the proce-
dural due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt was "bottomed on a fundamental value determination of
our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than
to let a guilty man go free."4 '
When one applies the three-factor Mathews procedural due
process test to the safeguard of appellate review, the same inter-
ests of "immense importance" that were at stake in Winship
argue heavily in favor of the conclusion that procedural due pro-
cess requires recognition of an absolute right to an appeal. In
assessing the risk of erroneous deprivation, however, it should be
36. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
37. Id. at 363.
38. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See supra text accompanying note 33.
39. 397 U.S. at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
41. Id.
19851
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noted that the procedural safeguard of a right to an appeal is
qualitatively different from most other procedural safeguards.
While the United States Supreme Court has held consistently
that "some kind of hearing is required" before a citizen is finally
deprived of a protected liberty or property interest,42 a claim to
a constitutional right to an appeal is premised upon the notion
that procedural due process mandates that there be some kind
of a second hearing.43 A due process right to an appeal in a crim-
inal case must necessarily rest on the premise that the first hear-
ing-the trial-is not a sufficient procedural protection, even
though the trial itself contains procedural protections such as
notice of the charge against the defendant, representation by
counsel, trial by jury, the right to confront and cross-examine all
witnesses against the accused, and the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial judge is the only actor in the criminal justice sys-
tem who has the power to ensure that the accused actually
receives all of the other procedural due process safeguards guar-
anteed by the federal Bill of Rights and the rules of evidence. If
the trial judge fails to protect the defendant's rights adequately,
then unless the defendant has recourse to appellate review, all of
the theoretically guaranteed constitutional rights may prove
worthless. Unless the concentrated powers of the trial judge are
to go unchecked, some type of a second hearing-an appeal-is
constitutionally required by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
An absolute right to appeal functions as a check against the
erroneous judgment, or the intentional despotism, of the solitary
trial judge. As Justice Brennan recently observed:
There are few, if any, situations in our system of justice in
which a single judge is given unreviewable discretion over mat-
ters concerning a person's liberty or property, and the reversal
rate of criminal convictions on mandatory appeals in the state
courts, while not overwhelming, is certainly high enough to
suggest that depriving defendants of their right to appeal
would expose them to an unacceptable risk of erroneous
conviction.4
42. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 16 (1977) (cit-
ing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974)).
43. See generally Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267
(1975).
44. Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3315 n.1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
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Appeal as a matter of right in criminal cases should be a
guaranteed element of procedural due process simply because
two heads, or three, or more, are better than one. Or as the
American Bar Association Section on Judicial Administration
stated: "The principal reason for having appellate courts is to
provide an opportunity for several minds to check the trial deci-
sions made by one mind."" In addition, the trial judge's percep-
tion of a criminal trial is very different from the perspective of
an appellate court.
The trial judge is on the front line and, consequently, his
decisions must be made rapidly. The appellate court is not
under any pressure to decide an appeal quickly.
[The] trial judge receives evidence serially over a period of
time as testimony and exhibits are presented, [but] an appel-
late court begins with a completed record that presents at once
all relevant factual materials. The legal issues tend to come
into focus in a trial as the evidence unfolds. An appeal begins
with a shaped set of legal questions."
These factors, which tend to increase the risk of error in the trial
court, are mitigated by the requirement that every defendant be
afforded the right to appellate review by a court with more
minds, more time, and a comprehensive and focused picture of a
completed trial.
In summary, a modern due process analysis of the proce-
dural safeguards afforded by an absolute right to appeal in all
criminal cases leads to the conclusion that the risk of convicting
the innocent, even when compared to the considerable financial
and administrative burdens of maintaining the appellate courts,
more than justifies the imposition of a requirement that every
defendant be guaranteed the right to meaningful appellate
review. This conclusion is in accord with the recommendations
also Young v. Konz, 88 Wash. 2d 276, 558 P.2d 791 (1977):
Due process of the law requires a fair trial for each defendant; the fair trial
guaranty is protected through the appeals process. It is conceded that a fair
trial may in certain cases not be afforded by a nonlawyer judge; but we may
properly point out that it is also true that a lawyer judge may commit error
and thereby deny a fair trial. The due process safeguard in both cases is appeal
Id. at 280, 558 P.2d at 793 (emphasis in original).
45. ABA, Section of Judicial Administration, Internal Operating Procedures of
Appellate Courts 14 (1961).
46. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Criminal Appeals, Standard 21-1.2, commen-
tary (Aug. 9, 1978).
19851
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made by the ABA Task Force on Criminal Appeals: "The possi-
bility of appellate review of trial court judgments should exist
for every criminal conviction. It is undesirable to have any class
of cases in which trial court determinations are unreviewable. 4 7
The Task Force observed that today there is "no dissent from
the principle that every convicted defendant should be afforded
the opportunity to obtain one judicial review of the conviction
by a tribunal other than the one in which the defendant was
tried."48 However, just as Justice Brennan noted in a recent dis-
senting opinion,49 the Task Force recognized that "[s]o long as
there is no change in the universal recognition of a right to
appeal, there will be no occasion to obtain any authoritative
judicial determination" whether there is a federal constitutional
right to an appeal in a criminal case."0
In Washington State, however, we need not be concerned
with this federal issue, for article I, section 22 of the Washington
Constitution expressly guarantees the right to appeal in all crim-
inal cases. Bearing in mind that the essential function served by
the right to appeal is to reduce the risk of erroneously convicting
the innocent, we may now examine some of the consequences of
constitutionalizing the right to appeal in criminal cases.
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRESENT ORAL ARGUMENT
What are the essential attributes of an appeal? At the very
least, they should include the right to submit a written brief to
an appellate court and the right to make oral argument before
an appellate tribunal. In recent years, however, there has been a
growing trend towards elimination of oral argument in selected
cases. In Washington State, where the right to appeal in crimi-
nal cases is of constitutional magnitude, the question arises
whether the elimination of oral argument in criminal cases
would be unconstitutional.
On June 14, 1984, the Washington Supreme Court promul-
gated a new Rule of Appellate Procedure, which created a
47. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Criminal Appeals, Standard 21-1.1 (Aug. 9,
1978).
48. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Criminal Appeals, Standard 21-1.1, commen-
tary (Aug. 9, 1978).
49. Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3315 n.1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
supra text accompanying note 44.
50. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Criminal Appeals, Standard 21-1.1, commen-
tary (Aug. 9, 1978).
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"Motion on the Merits."5 If granted, a motion pursuant to new
51. WASH. R. App. P. 18.14 provides as follows:
MOTION ON THE MERITS
(a) Generally. The appellate court may, on its own motion or on motion of a
party, affirm a decision or any part thereof on the merits in accordance with
the procedures defined in this rule. A motion by a party pursuant to this rule
should be denominated a "motion on the merits." The general motion proce-
dures defined in Title 17 apply to a motion on the merits only to the extent
provided in this rule.
(b) Time. A party may submit a motion on the merits any time after the appel-
lant's brief has been filed. The appellate court on its own motion may, at any
time, set a case on the motion calendar for disposition and enter orders the
court deems appropriate to facilitate the hearing and disposition of the case.
The clerk will notify the parties of the setting and of any orders entered by the
court.
(c) Content, Filing, and Service; Response. A motion on the merits should be a
separate document and should not be included within a party's brief on the
merits. The motion should comply with rule 17.3(a), except that material con-
tained in a brief may be incorporated by reference and need not be repeated in
the motion. The motion should be filed and served as provided in rule 17.4. A
response may be filed and served as provided in rule 17.4(e) and may incorpo-
rate material in a brief by reference.
(d) Who Decides Motion. A motion on the merits shall be determined initially
by a judge or commissioner of the appellate court.
(e) Considerations Governing Decision on Motion. A motion on the merits will
be granted in whole or in part if the appeal or any part thereof is determined
to be clearly without merit. In making these determinations, the judge or com-
missioner will consider all relevant factors including whether the issues on
review (1) are clearly controlled by settled law, (2) are factual and supported
by the evidence, or (3) are matters of judicial discretion and the decision was
clearly within the discretion of the trial court.
(f) Oral Argument. A motion on the merits may be denied without oral argu-
ment if the case obviously requires full appellate review. In all other instances
rule 17.5 applies to a motion on the merits, except that oral argument will
ordinarily be granted for a motion on the merits that is to be decided initially
by the judge or judges. If the appellate court initiates the motion on the mer-
its, the parties will be given an opportunity to submit briefs on the motion
before the date set for oral argument on the motion.
(g) Form of Decision Denying Motion. Rule 17.6 is applicable to a decision
denying a motion on the merits.
(h) Form of Decision Granting Motion. A ruling or decision granting a motion
on the merits will be concise and will include a description of the facts suffi-
cient to place the issues in context, a statement of the issues, and a resolution
of the issues with supportive reasons.
(i) Review of Ruling. A ruling or decision denying a motion on the merits or
referring the motion to the judges for decision pursuant to rule 17.2(b) is not
subject to review by the judges. A ruling or decision granting a motion on the
merits by a single judge or commissioner is subject to review as provided in
rule 17.7.
() Nondisqualification of Judge. Participation in a ruling or decision on a
motion on the merits does not thereby disqualify a judge from further partici-
pation in the case.
(k) Procedure Optional with Court. The Supreme Court or any division of the
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RAP 18.14 permits an appellate court commissioner to affirm all
or part of the decision of the trial court.52 The rule instructs the
commissioner to grant the motion in those appeals found to be"clearly without merit."53 The commissioner will normally hear
oral argument before deciding a motion on the merits.54 If the
commissioner grants the motion, the losing party may move for
modification of the commissioner's ruling by a panel of judges.5
Ordinarily, however, a party is not allowed oral argument on a
motion to modify a commissioner's ruling.56 Consequently, under
RAP 18.14, a party can lose an appeal without ever having had
an opportunity to present oral argument to a three-judge panel
of the court of appeals.
Rule 18.14 purports to apply to both criminal and civil
cases. The question remains, however, whether the constitu-
tional guarantee of a right to appeal in all criminal cases renders
the new rule unconstitutional as applied to criminal cases. The
answer should be yes.
Analytically, the issue is best resolved by applying the pro-
cedural due process test of Mathews v. Eldridge. Does oral argu-
ment reduce the risk of erroneously affirming the convictions of
innocent defendants? If it does, does the reduction of risk justify
the increased administrative and financial burdens imposed on
appellate courts if oral argument is held to be a mandatory ele-
ment of procedural due process?
Appellate judges have repeatedly attested to the significance
of oral argument. Their remarks indicate their clear judgment
that a good oral argument can often be the decisive factor in an
appeal. Justice Brennan has stated that "oral argument is the
absolutely indispensable ingredient of appellate advocacy ....
[O]ften my whole notion of what a case is about crystallizes at
oral argument. ' 57 Chief Justice Hughes wrote that:
the desirability ... of a full exposition by oral argument...
is not to be gainsaid, for it is a great saving of time of the court
Court of Appeals may, by general order, decide not to use the procedure
defined by this rule.
52. WASH. R. APP. P. 18.14(a).
53. WASH. R. APP. P. 18.14(e).
54. WASH. R. APP. P. 18.14(f). See also WASH. R. APP. P. 17.5.
55. WASH. R. APP. P. 18.14(i). See also WASH. R. APP. P. 17.7.
56. WASH. R. APP. P. 17.5(b).
57. R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 358 (1981) (quoting
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, OCCASIONAL PAMPHLET No. 9, at 22-23 (1967)).
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in the examination of extended records and briefs, to obtain
the grasp of the case that is made possible by oral discussion
and to be able more quickly to separate the wheat from the
chaff.5 s
Justice Frankfurter believed that "[o]ral argument frequently
has a force beyond what the written word conveys." 59 Justice
Harlan advised appellate lawyers: "[Y]our oral argument on an
appeal is perhaps the most effective weapon you have got if you
will give it the time and attention it deserves." 0 Similarly, the
late Arthur T. Vanderbilt, former Chief Justice of the New
Jersey Supreme Court opined: "[C]ases that are not argued well
are not well decided." '
Whenever the elimination of oral argument has been pro-
posed as a means of expediting the appellate process, it has met
with fervent opposition. In 1975 the Commission on Revision of
the Federal Court Appellate System reported its conclusions on
the subject of eliminating oral argument:
[Tihe Commission recognizes the importance of safeguarding
the right to oral argument in all cases where it is appropriate.
Oral argument is an essential part of the appellate process. It
contributes to judicial accountability, it guards against undue
reliance upon staff work, and it promotes understanding in
ways that cannot be matched by written communication. It
assures the litigant that his case has been given consideration
by those charged with deciding it. The hearing of argument
takes a small proportion of any appellate court's time; the sav-
ing of time achieved by discouraging argument is too small to
justify routinely dispensing with oral argument.62
Recently, in In re Marriage of Wolfe, 3 the Washington
58. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 62-63 (1928).
59. Rosenburg v. Denno, 346 U.S. 271, 272 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
60. Harlan, What Part Does the Oral Argument Play in the Conduct of an Appeal?,
41 CORNELL L.Q. 6, 11 (1955).
61. Address by Arthur T. Vanderbilt, American Bar Association Conference of Chief
Justices (Sept. 1949), reprinted in 9 F.R.D. 629, 639 (1950).
62. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Proposed Revi-
sion (June 1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 254-55 (1975). The Commission's report led
to the subsequent adoption of rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. That
rule sets up a presumption that oral argument shall be granted in all cases unless a panel
of three judges, after examination of the briefs and record, unanimously concludes that
oral argument is not needed. Even then, the court must provide the parties with an
opportunity to file a statement of reasons why oral argument should be heard.
63. 99 Wash. 2d 531, 663 P.2d 469 (1983).
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Supreme Court held that a show cause summary affirmance pro-
cedure used by Division Three of the Washington Court of
Appeals did not violate the constitutional rights of the appel-
lant. 4 However, the court's ruling was accompanied by a signifi-
cant caveat: "We approve the show cause procedure in appropri-
ate civil matters; we reserve judgment, however, on the propriety
of its use in criminal cases. '65 Thus, the supreme court acknowl-
edged inferentially that the accused's constitutional right to an
appeal under article I, section 22 may mandate a different result
if the appellate courts attempt to eliminate oral argument in
criminal cases. Now that RAP 18.14 has been adopted, the ques-
tion of whether an appellate court may affirm a criminal convic-
tion without affording the defendant the opportunity to make
oral argument before a panel of judges is ripe for adjudication.
It is not enough, however, simply to recognize that the right
to an appeal encompasses the right to make an oral argument.
Courts must also recognize that the content of that oral argu-
ment cannot be unreasonably restricted. Unfortunately, the
recently promulgated "motion on the merits" rule restricts the
content of the appellant's argument. Even if the appellate court
decides to permit the appellant a chance to present oral argu-
ment to a panel of judges, the focus of the appellate court's
inquiry at that juncture is unreasonably narrowed, and the
appellant's attorney is not at liberty to address the merits of the
appeal.
Rule of Appellate Procedure 18.14 provides that in deciding
whether an appeal is "clearly without merit," the appellate court
is to consider all relevant factors, including three specific issues:
"[W]hether the issues on review (1) are clearly controlled by set-
tled law, (2) are factual and supported by the evidence, or (3)
are matters of judicial discretion and the decision was clearly
within the discretion of the trial court." 6 But a limited inquiry
into these three areas is not the equivalent of an inquiry into the
merits of a criminal appeal. The text of RAP 18.14 concedes this
much by differentiating between appellate review of a motion on
the merits and "full appellate review. '6 7
Although the rule appears to be designed to weed out frivo-
lous appeals, the language of RAP 18.14(e) is so broad that it
64.' Id. at 536, 663 P.2d at 472.
65. Id. at 532, 663 P.2d at 469-70.
66. WASH. R. App. P. 18.14(e).
67. WASH. R. App. P. 18.14(f) (emphasis added).
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encompasses many nonfrivolous appeals. Rule 18.9 provides that
the appellate court "will, on motion of a party, dismiss review of
a case ... if the application for review is frivolous, moot, or
solely for the purpose of delay."6 8 Since the power to dismiss
frivolous appeals was already codified in RAP 18.9, the promul-
gation of the motion on the merits rule reflects a desire to elimi-
nate other nonfrivolous appeals.
Washington courts have generally defined a frivolous appeal
as one that presents "no debatable issues upon which reasonable
minds might differ, and [that] .. .is so totally devoid of merit
that there is no reasonable possibility of reversal."69 In the con-
text of a civil case, when the right to appeal is not premised
upon the state constitution, the Washington Supreme Court has
approved a number of factors for courts to consider when decid-
ing whether an appeal is "frivolous":
(1) A civil appellant has a right to appeal under RAP 2.2; (2)
all doubts as to whether the appeal is frivolous should be
resolved in favor of the appellant; (3) the record should be con-
sidered as a whole; (4) an appeal that is affirmed simply
because the arguments are rejected is not frivolous . . ..
If all doubts are to be resolved in favor of a civil appellant, then
a fortiori, in criminal cases the presumption should be even
stronger that the defendant's constitutional right to appeal
should not be forfeited on grounds of frivolousness.
A comparison of this definition of "frivolousness" with the
criteria set forth in RAP 18.14(e) reveals that the rule permits
the summary dismissal of nonfrivolous appeals. For example,
according to the rule, a motion on the merits should be granted
if the appeal presents issues that are "clearly controlled by set-
tled law."'71 If this rule is routinely applied, the evolution of the
law will grind to a halt. It would no longer be possible to over-
rule past precedents in the light of a reassessment of "settled"
68. WASH. R. App. P. 18.9(c).
69. Streater v. White, 26 Wash. App. 430, 435, 613 P.2d 187, 191 (1980). See also
Estate of Pesterkoff, 37 Wash. App. 418, 680 P.2d 1062 (1984); Langston v. Huffacker, 36
Wash. App. 779, 678 P.2d 1265 (1984); Dearborn Lumber Co. v. Upton Enter., 34 Wash.
App. 490, 662 P.2d 76 (1983); Allen v. Seattle Police Guild, 32 Wash. App. 56, 645 P.2d
1113 (1982), aff'd, 100 Wash. 2d 361, 670 P.2d 246 (1983); Seattle v. Snoj, 28 Wash. App.
613, 625 P.2d 179 (1981).
70. Millers Casualty Ins. Co. v. Briggs, 100 Wash. 2d 9, 15, 665 P.2d 887, 891 (1983)
(quoting Streater v. White, 26 Wash. App. 430, 434-35, 613 P.2d 187, 191 (1980)).
71. WASH. R. App. P. 18.14(e)(1).
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principles.
Imagine what would have happened if the United States
Supreme Court had had a "motion on the merits" rule when
attorney Abe Fortas filed his certiorari petition in the landmark
case of Gideon v. Wainwright.2 The question presented by the
certiorari petition was: "Should this Court's holding in Betts v.
Brady be reconsidered? 7 3 The responding attorney general rep-
resenting the State of Florida would have quickly filed a motion
on the merits requesting summary dismissal on the ground that
Gideon's case was "clearly controlled by settled law," for, of
course, Gideon's case was controlled by Betts v. Brady.4
The issue was, however, whether the Supreme Court should"unsettle" the issue and change the firmly established principle
that an indigent accused is not constitutionally entitled to the
appointment of counsel in a state court criminal trial. Given the
existence of a rule like RAP 18.14(e), "clearly settled law" would
be unassailable, and Betts v. Brady might still be good law
today.
Similarly, in State v. Ringer,5 the Washington Supreme
Court re-examined a search and seizure issue that was "clearly
controlled by settled law." Yet, the court chose to overrule an
entire line of its own decisions and refused to follow United
States Supreme Court precedents in order to "return to the pro-
tections of [the state] constitution and to interpret them consis-
tent with their common law beginnings. "76 By precluding the
appellant from raising the question whether prior settled case
law should be overturned, RAP 18.14(e)(1) would have effec-
tively nipped the Ringer decision in the bud. Thus, the motion
on the merits rule conflicts with Justice Douglas's rosy pro-
nouncement that "happily, all constitutional questions are
always open.'77 To the contrary, under RAP 18.14(e)(1), once"clearly settled," a constitutional issue is forever closed to re-
examination.
Rule 18.14(e)(2) sanctions the summary dismissal of all
appeals in which the issues are "factual and supported by the
evidence." This provision of the rule collides head-on with the
72. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
73. Id. at 338 (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 338-39.
75. 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983).
76. Id. at 699, 674 P.2d at 1247.
77. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 346 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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"clearly settled" principle that when constitutional rights are at
issue, the appellate court is obligated to make an independent
de novo evaluation of the testimony and to reach its own conclu-
sions as to the facts.1 8 Moreover, appellate judges frequently
reach quite different factual conclusions. For example, in State
v. Imus,1 9 two judges were convinced that "the facts of this case
comport with the standards" for honoring a criminal defendant's
request that he be allowed to represent himself.80 In a strongly
worded dissent, however, one judge protested that his colleagues
had ignored those portions of the record that did not support
the majority's factual conclusions.8 "
Faced with the language of RAP 18.14(e)(2), the appellant
in Imus would have been unable to argue the merits of his
appeal. Since the issue on appeal was "factual" and, arguably,
was "supported by the evidence," the appeal would have been
dismissed without issuance of a decision on the merits, even
though appellate courts are obligated to make a de novo deter-
mination of the facts that apply to the exercise of constitutional
rights. No appellate judge would ever reach the point of deciding
whether, in fact, the defendant's sixth amendment right to coun-
sel had been violated. Instead, the appellate court would simply
dismiss on the ground that the issue was "factual" and that
there was evidence to support the trial judge's determination.
Finally, RAP 18.14(e)(3) requires the dismissal of appeals
that concern "matters of judicial discretion" when "the decision
was clearly within the discretion of the trial court." But the law
libraries are full of reported decisions in which appellate court
judges disagreed violently as to whether judicial discretion was
abused. Rather than air such disagreement between appellate
judges, RAP 18.14(e)(3) opts instead to avoid deciding these
cases altogether.
In State v. Saltarelli,82 the Washington Supreme Court
78. See, e.g., State v. Daugherty, 94 Wash. 2d 263, 269, 616 P.2d 649, 652 (1980);
State v. Sweet, 90 Wash. 2d 282, 289, 581 P.2d 579, 583 (1978); State v. Byers, 88 Wash.
2d 1, 11, 559 P.2d 1334, 1339 (1977) (Revelle, J., concurring); State v. Smith, 72 Wash. 2d
479, 481, 434 P.2d 5, 7 (1967).
79. 37 Wash. App. 170, 679 P.2d 376 (1984).
80. Id. at 177, 679 P.2d at 381.
81. Id. at 181, 679 P.2d at 383 (Ringold, J., dissenting). Compare id. at 190, 679
P.2d at 388 (Ringold, J., dissenting) ("I cannot find in the record before us an unequivo-
cal request to proceed to trial without counsel .... ") with id. at 181, 679 P.2d at 382
("We are convinced that Imus' request to represent himself was unequivocal .... ").
82. 98 Wash. 2d 358, 655 P.2d 697 (1982).
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reversed a unanimous decision of the court of appeals"3 and held
that the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting evidence
of a prior offense committed by the defendant. The supreme
court justices were not unanimous in their judgment, however,
for three of the nine justices dissented. Thus, a total of twelve
appellate judges examined the issue in this case: six found an
abuse of discretion; six found no abuse of discretion. Under RAP
18.14(e)(3), however, the case might never have been decided at
all, had a commissioner viewed the matter as "clearly within the
discretion of the trial court."8' 4
This overview of the provisions of RAP 18.14(e) demon-
strates that even if an appellate court permits oral argument to
a panel of judges when deciding a motion on the merits, the
appellant's attorney will not have an opportunity to argue the
true merits of the case. Instead, counsel will be constrained to
argue that the appeal is being improperly classified. Argument
on a motion on the merits will focus merely upon whether the
instant appeal falls within the purview of RAP 18.14(e).
If appellant's counsel concedes that the issues raised are
clearly controlled by settled law, or largely factual, or governed
by an abuse of discretion standard, the attorney will risk losing
the opportunity to obtain "full appellate review" on the merits
of the case. In responding to a motion on the merits, the appel-
lant cannot effectively argue, "Even if it does fall within subsec-
tion (e), we should still win." The appellant is foreclosed from
arguing that settled case law should be overturned, that the
facts were incorrectly determined, or that judicial discretion was
abused. The appellant's oral argument on a motion on the mer-
its is confined to an attempt to rebut the assertion that the case
may be pigeonholed into one of the three categories of appeals
described by RAP 18.14(e).
Rule 18.14(e) insidiously restricts the scope of appellate
review. Even if the appellant is afforded oral argument on the
motion, this argument does not reach the merits of the case
because the appellant is not yet entitled to address the merits.
The rule thus threatens to destroy the defendant's constitu-
83. 29 Wash. App. 565, 629 P.2d 1344 (1981), rev'd, 98 Wash. 2d 358, 655 P.2d 697
(1982).
84. For another example of radically different views on the subject of abuse of judi-
cial discretion, see State v. Adams, 76 Wash. 2d 650, 458 P.2d 558 (1969) (court split 5-4
on the issue of whether the trial judge erred in admitting gruesome autopsy photographs
of a murder victim), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947 (1971).
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tional right to an appeal. The rule demands that the appellant
prove that the appeal should not be categorized as a member of
one of three classes of appeals. These classes are so broadly
defined that they include a host of nonfrivolous appeals. But
until this threshold barrier is surmounted, the right to appeal is
held hostage. Failure to meet the test of RAP 18.14 deprives the
appellant of any opportunity to argue the merits of the
appeal-to argue that he did not receive a fair trial.
IV. WAIVER AND ABANDONMENT OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL
Because the right to appeal in criminal cases is of constitu-
tional magnitude, the Washington Supreme Court has taken a
very strict view of waivers of the right to appeal.85 The right to
appeal "is to be accorded the highest respect," and is not to be
diluted by any lax application of the doctrine of waiver." The
court has placed the burden expressly on the state to prove
"that a convicted defendant has made a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waiver of the right to appeal." 7
The fact that the sentencing judge advised the defendant of
the right to appeal, as required by Criminal Rule 7.1(b), will not,
standing alone, be sufficient to prove that the defendant waived
the constitutional right to appeal by failing to file timely notice
of appeal.8 8 In State v. Sweet,8 9 the defendant was erroneously
advised by a jailer that he could get legal assistance in filing his
appeal from legal services lawyers after his transfer from county
jail to prison. By the time he arrived at the prison, the thirty-
day period for filing notice of appeal" had expired. Legal ser-
vices lawyers then filed a post-conviction relief petition on
behalf of the defendant, seeking reinstatement of his right to
85. See, e.g., State v. Ashbaugh, 90 Wash. 2d 432, 583 P.2d 1206 (1978); State v.
Sweet, 90 Wash. 2d 282, 581 P.2d 579 (1978).
86. State v. Sweet, 90 Wash. 2d 282, 286-87, 581 P.2d 579, 581-82 (1978).
87. Id. at 286, 581 P.2d at 581. See State v. Ashbaugh, 90 Wash. 2d 432, 439, 583
P.2d 1206, 1210 (1978).
88. "[I]n addition to showing strict compliance with CrR 7.1(b) by reading appeal
rights to a defendant, the circumstances must at least reasonably give rise to an infer-
ence the defendant understood the import of the court rule and did in fact willingly and
intentionally relinquish a known right." State v. Sweet, 90 Wash. 2d 282, 287, 581 P.2d
579, 582 (1978). "[Tlhere is no presumption in favor of waiver of the right to appeal, and
the reading of CrR 7.1(b) to a convicted defendant may not in itself give rise to such a
presumption." Id. at 288, 581 P.2d at 582.
89. 90 Wash. 2d 282, 581 P.2d 579 (1978).
90. See WASH. R. App. P. 5.2.
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appeal. At an evidentiary hearing, the superior court denied the
relief requested. The supreme court reversed the superior court
and reinstated the defendant's right to appeal, more than three
years after the original date of conviction.9 1 The court noted
that the defendant's trial counsel had withdrawn following sen-
tencing, without filing notice of appeal.2 This fact, coupled with
the fact that the defendant was advised by a jailer to wait until
he arrived at prison to file his appeal, led the Washington
Supreme Court to conclude that "he did not knowingly and will-
ingly relinquish his right to appeal. 9 3
In State v. Ashbaugh,94 the defendant's attorney filed a
notice of appeal on the last day of the thirty-day filing period,
but failed to post the required $25 filing fee on that day. The
superior court clerk returned the notice of appeal with a letter
stating that the required filing fee had not been paid. Counsel
then refiled the notice of appeal with the filing fee, one day past
the deadline for filing notice of appeal.9 5 The court of appeals
dismissed the defendant's appeal on the ground that it was filed
one day late. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, stressing
that the right to appeal a criminal conviction is a constitutional
right and noting that a criminal defendant should not be penal-
ized for the oversight of his attorney.9 The case was remanded
to the court of appeals for a determination of whether the defen-
dant's alleged "abandonment" of his appeal was "knowing, intel-
ligent and voluntary. '97
Although the prosecution bears a heavy burden of proof to
show waiver of the right of appeal, the Washington Supreme
Court has held, on one occasion, that a valid waiver was
proved.98 Furthermore, a plea of guilty ordinarily constitutes a
waiver of the right to appeal.99 On the other hand, a plea of
91. 90 Wash. 2d at 290, 581 P.2d at 584.
92. Id. at 284, 581 P.2d at 580.
93. Id. at 290, 581 P.2d at 584.
94. 90 Wash. 2d 432, 583 P.2d 1206 (1978).
95. Id. at 433, 583 P.2d at 1207.
96. Id. at 439, 583 P.2d at 1210.
97. Id.
98. In re Hanson, 94 Wash. 2d 798, 620 P.2d 95 (1980) (trial court twice led defen-
dant through information about his right to appeal, defendant indicated an unequivocal
understanding of his rights, and defendant was at all times effectively represented by
counsel).
99. State v. Majors, 94 Wash. 2d 354, 356, 616 P.2d 1237, 1237 (1980); Young v.
Konz, 88 Wash. 2d 276, 283, 558 P.2d 791, 794 (1977); State v. Eckert, 123 Wash. 403,
404, 212 P. 551, 552 (1923).
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guilty does not preclude an appeal when collateral issues are
raised, such as the validity of the charging statute, the suffi-
ciency of the information, the jurisdiction of the court, or the
circumstances under which the plea was made.'
The Washington Supreme Court's zealous defense of the
right to appeal against "waiver" is in conflict, however, with the
court's traditional approach towards defendants who escape
from custody while their appeals are pending. In State v. Mos-
ley,' 0 the court endorsed the "well settled" rule that "where the
defendant flees from the jurisdiction pending the appeal, he
thereby waives his right to prosecute the appeal, unless within a
time fixed he returns and surrenders himself into the custody of
the proper officer or gives bail for his appearance. "'0'
Oddly enough, the decision in Mosley is pure dictum in at
least one sense. The defendant in Mosley did receive direct
appellate review of his conviction by the court of appeals, which
affirmed his conviction.' Mosley then petitioned for review in
the Washington Supreme Court, but after the petition was
granted, Mosley escaped from the custody of the Department of
Social and Health Services. 104 The Washington Supreme Court
concluded that it would not review the merits of Mosley's peti-
tion and entered an order conditionally dismissing the case
unless Mosley surrendered himself before the court's opinion
was filed.' 05 Consequently, Mosley was denied a second level of
appellate review by the supreme court, but he was not denied an
appeal altogether.
Furthermore, Mosley's appellate counsel acknowledged to
the Washington Supreme Court that dismissal of the appeal of
an escaped convict was the "prevailing practice," and counsel
100. See State v. Majors, 94 Wash. 2d 354, 356, 616 P.2d 1237, 1238 (1980); Young v.
Konz, 88 Wash. 2d 276, 283, 558 P.2d 791, 794 (1977); State ex rel. Fisher v. Bowman, 57
Wash. 2d 535, 536, 358 P.2d 316, 317 (1961); State v. Rose, 42 Wash. 2d 509, 514, 256
P.2d 493, 497 (1953).
101. 84 Wash. 2d 608, 528 P.2d 986 (1974).
102. Id. at 609, 528 P.2d at 986-87. Accord State ex rel. Soudas v. Brinker, 128
Wash. 319, 323, 222 P. 615, 616 (1924); State v. Handy, 27 Wash. 469, 470, 67 P. 1094,
1094 (1902); State v. Nason, 20 Wash. App. 433, 434, 579 P.2d 366, 366 (1978). Cf. State
v. Beck, 23 Wash. App. 640, 641-42, 598 P.2d 400, 401 (1979) (defendant was convicted
in district court, appealed, but did not show up for trial de novo in superior court; his
appeal from the district court was dismissed).
103. 84 Wash. 2d at 608, 528 P.2d at 986.
104. Id. at 609, 528 P.2d at 986.
105. Id. at 611, 528 P.2d at 988.
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did not question the constitutionality of that practice. 0 6 The
issue of whether a convicted defendant forfeits the right to one
direct appeal when he escapes from custody, therefore, was not
decided in Mosley, and no constitutional argument premised
upon article I, section 22 was raised before the court. The court
of appeals, however, subsequently applied the Mosley dismissal
rule to a direct appeal in State v. Nason.107 The constitutional-
ity of the result in Nason is now cast in doubt by the Washing-
ton Supreme Court's recent comments in State v. Koloske.10 s
In Koloske, the supreme court again dismissed the case of a
convicted defendant on escape status. The court took pains,
however, to differentiate between the position of a defendant
whose case was on direct appeal in the court of appeals and a
defendant who had already obtained review in the court of
appeals and who sought further discretionary review in the
Washington Supreme Court:
Koloske's counsel argues that because a defendant has a con-
stitutional right to an appeal in this state, an appeal cannot be
dismissed unless the State proves a knowing and voluntary
waiver of the right. In Koloske's case, however, he has already
completed his appeal by obtaining review as a matter of right
in the Court of Appeals. He is now seeking, in this court, dis-
cretionary review of the Court of Appeals decision. Our refusal
to proceed with discretionary review in the absence of defen-
dant does not raise the constitutional issue.'0 9
By recognizing the distinction between direct appeal as a
matter of constitutional right and discretionary review, the
Koloske decision seems to imply that the applicability of Mosley
to cases pending on direct appeal may be re-examined in a later
case where the constitutional issue is squarely presented. Should
such a re-examination occur, it would be useful for the Washing-
ton Supreme Court to note that Washington case law was
derived from older decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. State v. Handy,"0 the first Washington case to address
this issue, relied principally upon Smith v. United States.'
106. Id. at 611, 528 P.2d at 987.
107. 20 Wash. App. 433, 434, 579 P.2d 366, 366 (1978) (direct appeal dismissed on
prosecutor's motion because of defendant's escape from work release facility).
108. 100 Wash. 2d 889, 676 P.2d 456 (1984).
109. Id. at 892, 676 P.2d at 458-59 (footnote and citations omitted).
110. 27 Wash. 469, 67 P. 1094 (1902).
111. 94 U.S. 97 (1876).
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Smith is distinguishable, however, because there is no federal
constitutional right to appeal equivalent to article I, section 22
of the Washington Constitution.
The cases that support the rule of dismissal for appellants
who escape rely primarily on three rationales: waiver, mootness,
and contempt." 2 The "waiver" rationale is the least defensible,
for it is ludicrous to assert that the escaping defendant is mak-
ing a conscious, voluntary, and intelligent decision to forfeit the
right to an appeal. If every incarcerated convict were specifically
advised that an escape would result in the loss of the right to
appeal, then it might be said that every escapee made a volun-
tary decision to give up the right to appellate review of the con-
viction. But such advisements are not made, and it is nonsensi-
cal to claim that a convict going over the wall is pondering the
legal consequences of the action on a pending appeal.
The "mootness" rationale was first advanced by the United
States Supreme Court in Smith v. United States,115 when Chief
Justice Waite explained why the Court would not decide a case
in which the defendant had escaped from custody:
If we affirm the judgment, he is not likely to appear to submit
to his sentence. If we reverse it and order a new trial, he will
appear or not, as he may consider most for his interest. Under
such circumstances, we are not inclined to hear and decide
what may prove to be only a moot case.""
The United States Supreme Court reiterated the mootness
rationale in Eisler v. United States. 15 A majority of the Eisler
112. See Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534 (1975), for a discussion of the dubious
deterrent against escape created by art. 44.09 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
which provided:
If the defendant, pending an appeal in the felony case, makes his escape from
custody, the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals shall no longer
attach in the case. Upon the fact of such escape being made to appear, the
court shall, on motion of the State's attorney, dismiss the appeal; but the order
dismissing the appeal shall be set aside if it is made to appear that the defen-
dant has voluntarily returned within ten days to the custody of the officer from
whom he escaped; and in cases where the punishment inflicted by the jury is
death or confinement in an institution operated by the Department of Correc-
tions for life, the court may in its discretion reinstate the appeal if the defen-
dant is recaptured or voluntarily surrenders within thirty days after such
escape.
Estelle, 420 U.S. at 535 n.1 (quoting TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.09).
113. 94 U.S. 97 (1876).
114. Id.
115. 338 U.S. 189 (1949) (per curiam).
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Court decided that because the petitioner's flight from the coun-
try might render any judgment on the merits moot, it was neces-
sary to remove the case from the Court's docket indefinitely,
pending Eisler's return to the United States.11 However, the
Court did not dismiss the case. Instead, the Court directed that"after this term the cause will be left off the docket until a
direction to the contrary shall issue. 1 7
Justice Frankfurter dissented, arguing that Eisler's case
should be permanently dismissed and not simply placed in
limbo pending Eisler's possible return." 8 Frankfurter insisted
that Eisler's flight deprived the Court of jurisdiction to decide
the case because the judgment of the Court was unenforceable:
If legal questions brought by a litigant are to remain here, the
litigant must stay with them. When he withdraws himself from
the power of the Court to enforce its judgment, he also with-
draws the questions which he had submitted to the Court's
adjudication. The questions brought by Eisler have evaporated
so far as the Court's power to deal with them is concerned
because the rights and obligations of a litigant no longer
depend on their answer. The Court therefore lacks jurisdiction
119
Frankfurter distinguished prior cases in which the Court had
postponed action indefinitely until the defendants were recap-
tured because those cases involved "local jailbreaks" and not
international flight.1 0
Justices Murphy and Jackson also wrote separate dissenting
opinions, criticizing the majority's mootness rationale and con-
tending that the case should be decided notwithstanding Eisler's
flight. Justice Murphy agreed that moot cases should not be
decided, but disagreed that Eisler's case was moot: "[A] moot
case is one in which the particular controversy confronting the
Court has ended. That is not true when a prisoner has simply
escaped. We are not at liberty to assume that all escaped defen-
dants will never return to the jurisdiction."'' Furthermore, Jus-
tice Murphy recognized that the fact that a case may become
116. Id. at 190.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 192-93 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 192.
120. Id. at 193 (distinguishing Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692 (1887); Smith v.
United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876)).
121. Eisler, 338 U.S. at 194 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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moot is not enough to justify treating the case as one that is
moot: "That the case may become moot if a defendant does not
return does not distinguish it from any other case we decide. For
subsequent events may render any decision nugatory."' 2
Finally, Justices Murphy and Jackson recognized that it was
the importance of the legal issues posed by the Eisler case, not
the importance of the defendant Eisler's conviction for contempt
of Congress, that had caused the Supreme Court to grant certio-
rari. "Those issues did not leave when Eisler did. They remain
here for decision," Justice Murphy declared.' 3 Similarly, Justice
Jackson insisted that the importance of rendering a decision to
guide Congress justified proceeding with Eisler's case: "[Lit is
due to Congress and to future witnesses before its committees
that we hand down a final decision . . . . I do not think we can
run away from the case just because Eisler has."'2 4
Although the Washington Supreme Court decided to dis-
miss the defendant's petition for review in Koloske, the court
was in the unique position of being able, nevertheless, to decide
the issues posed by the Koloske case, which was consolidated for
argument with another case involving the same issues.' 2 5 Thus,
unlike the Eisler Court, the Koloske court did not "run away
from" the issue.
Twenty-one years after Eisler, the United States Supreme
Court again dismissed a criminal case due to the appellant's
escape, but the Court did not base the dismissal on mootness.' e
On the contrary, the Court conceded that "an escape does not
strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or contro-
versy." 27 Instead, the Court premised the dismissal upon the
theory that an escape "disentitles the defendant to call upon the
resources of the Court for determination of his claims.' 112 8
This "disentitlement" theory is essentially a renamed vari-
ant of the "contempt" theory advanced nearly a century earlier
in Allen v. Georgia.'2 9 The contempt theory rests upon the
notion that if a convicted felon is going to insult the appellate
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 196 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
125. State v. Austin, 100 Wash. 2d 889, 676 P.2d 456 (1984).
126. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (1970).
127. Id. at 366.
128. Id.
129. 166 U.S. 138 (1897).
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courts by taking matters into his own hands and escaping, then
the defendant has no right to expect the appellate courts to hear
the case. The appellate courts assume the power to punish the
escapee, as if the escape were a contempt of court committed in
the court's presence, by refusing to decide the escapee's appeal.
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Allen v. Georgia
is the best articulation of the contempt theory:
We cannot say that the dismissal of a writ of error is not justi-
fied by the abandonment of his case by the plaintiff in the writ.
By escaping from legal custody he has, by the laws of most, if
not all of the States, committed a distinct criminal offence; and
it seems but a light punishment for such offence to hold that
he has thereby abandoned his right to prosecute a writ of error,
sued out to review his conviction. Otherwise he is put in a posi-
tion of saying to the court: 'Sustain my writ and I will surren-
der myself, and take my chances upon a second trial; deny me
a new trial and I will leave the State, or forever remain in hid-
ing.' We consider this as practically a declaration of the terms
upon which he is willing to surrender, and a contempt of its
authority, to which no court is bound to submit. It is much
more becoming to its dignity that the court should prescribe
the conditions upon which an escaped convict should be per-
mitted to appear and prosecute his writ, than that the latter
should dictate the terms upon which he will consent to surren-
der himself to its custody.'
The passage quoted above is a sound example of judicial
childishness. A court that descends to the level of the convicted
criminal says, in effect: "If you don't play by our rules, we won't
play at all." The contempt rationale justifies the dismissal of
appeals, including some that may be clearly meritorious, with
the idea that judicial pride must be maintained by showing
criminal defendants that courts will not tolerate the "insult" of
escape. Is it wise to leave unconstitutional, erroneous convictions
intact, and to risk incarcerating innocent defendants, simply to
punish them for escaping? Or is it wiser to decide their appeals
anyway, leaving the punishment for escape to prosecutors, who
can bring escape charges in the trial courts?'
130. Id. at 141.
131. Justice Stewart pointed out the inequities caused by a Texas statute that
required dismissal of the appeal of an escaped convict:
The statute imposes totally irrational punishments upon those subject to its
application. If an escaped felon has been convicted in violation of law, the loss
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Justice Murphy's answer to this question is the appropriate
one, and certainly is more suited to a jurisdiction, such as Wash-
ington, where the right to appeal is of constitutional magnitude:
Law is at its loftiest when it examines claimed injustice even at
the instance of one to whom the public is bitterly hostile. We
should be loath to shirk our obligations, whatever the creed of
the particular petitioner. Our country takes pride in requiring
of its institutions the examination, and correction of alleged
injustice whenever it occurs. We should not permit an affront
of this sort to distract us from the performance of our constitu-
tional duties.13
In conclusion, the doctrines of waiver, mootness, and con-
t.,npt are inadequate to justify the practice of dismissing crimi-
nal appeals of escaped defendants. Though automatic dismissal
may have been the "prevailing practice" at the time State v.
Mosley was decided, recent decisions indicate that the tide may
be turning. The Alaska Supreme Court rejected the rule of dis-
missal in White v. State,133 recognizing that even though the
right to appeal was only a statutory right in Alaska, it should be
protected by the same strict waiver standards applicable to con-
stitutional rights."3 The White court also recognized that there
were "adequate criminal sanctions to deter''135 escapes, without
the additional judicially imposed sanction of loss of an appeal:
We fail to find any reason why this court by judicial decree,
should add withdrawal of the right of appeal to the statutory
punishments prescribed for the crime of escape. In addition to
bordering on judicial legislation, such additional punishment
would have no relation to the crime involved. A convicted
of his right to appeal results in his serving a sentence that under law was erro-
neously imposed. If, on the other hand, his trial was free of reversible error, the
loss of his right to appeal results in no punishment at all. And those whose
convictions would have been reversed if their appeals had not been dismissed
serve totally disparate sentences, dependent not upon the circumstances of
their escape, but upon whatever sentences may have been meted out under
their invalid convictions. In my view, this random pattern of punishment can-
not be considered a rational means of enforcing the State's interest in deter-
ring and punishing escape.
Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 544-45 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
132. Eisler, 338 U.S. at 194-95 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
133. 514 P.2d 814 (Alaska 1973).
134. Id. at 815 ("To find a waiver of such a right we must be convinced that there
was 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' There
has been no showing that White, by his escape, intended to waive his right of appeal.").
135. Id. at 815-16.
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defendant with a meritorious appeal from a sentence of life
imprisonment would suffer a totally unrelated severe penalty
as compared with a defendant sentenced to thirty days in
jail.136
Appellate courts of three other states have also rejected the
traditional approach of dismissing the appeals of escapees, rely-
ing in part upon the existence of a state constitutional right to
an appeal.1 3 7 The reasoning of the Supreme Court of New Mex-
ico is of particular relevance to Washington State:
The Constitution of New Mexico provides that an
aggrieved party shall have an absolute right to one appeal.
N.M. Const. Art. VI, § 2. A person convicted of a crime does
not forfeit his right to appeal simply because he has escaped
from confinement. He still has a right to have his conviction
reversed if he was erroneously convicted or if his constitutional
rights were violated. If he is granted a new trial, that trial can
always be held when he is recaptured. If his conviction is
affirmed, he stands in the same position as before the appeal,
but his rights have been protected by the New Mexico
Constitution.I38
The article I, section 22 right to appeal in the Washington
Constitution should not be judicially nullified as a reprisal for an
escape. The punishment for escape in Washington is prescribed
by statute.1 39 The Washington courts should not add loss of a
constitutional right to the legislatively authorized punish-
ment.140 The Washington Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Mosley should be overruled. At the very least, Mosley should be
confined to a rule of dismissal of petitions for review (as inti-
mated in Koloske) and held inapplicable to the first level of
appellate review in the court of appeals.
136. Id.
137. State v. Goldsmith, 112 Ariz. 399, 542 P.2d 1098 (1976); Marshall v. State, 344
So. 2d 646 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1977); Mascarenas v.
State, 94 N.M. 506, 612 P.2d 1317 (1980). But see State v. Brady, 655 P.2d 1132 (Utah
1982) (appeal of escapee that was dismissed prior to his recapture will not be reinstated).
138. Mascarenas v. State, 94 N.M. 506, 507, 612 P.2d 1317, 1318 (1980).
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.110 (1983).
140. Some states have legislatively overturned the practice of dismissing the appeals
of escapees. See, e.g., Sprouse v. State, 242 Ga. 831, 252 S.E.2d 173 (1979); State v. Fal-
cone, 383 So. 2d 1243 (La. 1980).
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V. LOST TRANSCRIPTS AND THE RIGHT TO MEANINGFUL
APPELLATE REVIEW
A constitutional right of appeal is of little value to a defen-
dant if the loss of the transcript or of the trial court record pre-
vents the appellate court from reviewing the case. Several juris-
dictions have recognized that in order to preserve the right to
appeal, the judicial remedy for loss of the trial court record must
be reversal and a new trial."'
Louisiana, like Washington, affords defendants a constitu-
tional right to appeal. 2 Article I, section 19 of the Louisiana
Constitution provides:
No person shall be subjected to imprisonment or forfeiture of
rights or property without the right of judicial review based
upon a complete record of all evidence upon which the judg-
ment is based. This right may be intelligently waived. The cost
of transcribing the record shall be paid as provided by law.
In the seminal case of State v. Ford,4" the Louisiana Supreme
Court reversed a second degree murder conviction because "[f]or
reasons which are unexplained, the court reporter did not record
the entire trial through mechanical or other means."'" The
reporter failed to record the testimony of four prosecution wit-
nesses, voir dire, and the prosecutor's opening statement. The
court flatly rejected the prosecution's contention that the defen-
dant should be required to make a showing of prejudice before a
reversal could be obtained.'45
The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that in the federal
court system, Congress had enacted a law providing that a court
reporter "shall record verbatim . . . all proceedings in criminal
cases held in open court."'"" Federal courts have consistently
held that failure to abide by this statutory requirement requires
reversal of any criminal conviction.' 47 Since automatic reversal is
141. See, e.g., Delap v. State, 350 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
3559 (1984); State v. Robinson, 387 So. 2d 1143 (La. 1980); State v. Jones, 351 So. 2d
1194 (La. 1977); State v. Ford, 338 So. 2d 107 (La. 1976); State v. Bizette, 334 So. 2d 392
(La. 1976); State v. Moore, 87 N.M. 412, 534 P.2d 1124 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975); Varney v.
Superintendent W. Va. Penitentiary, 264 S.E.2d 472 (W. Va. 1980).
142. LA. CONST. art. I, § 19.
143. 338 So. 2d 107 (La. 1976).
144. Id. at 108 (footnotes omitted).
145. Id. at 109-10.
146. Id. at 109 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 753(b)).
147. See, e.g., Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964); Herron v. United States,
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required to vindicate a defendant's statutory right in the federal
system, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that, a fortiori, auto-
matic reversal was required in Louisiana state courts when
defendants have a constitutional right to an appeal.14
The Ford court noted that the requirement of a complete
record of trial court proceedings is "designed to preserve a cor-
rect and authentic record of criminal proceedings free from the
infirmities of human error and . . . provide[s] a safeguard to
which not only the court but also the defendant is entitled in the
preservation of his rights."'149 The Ford court followed the
approach of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit and ordered convictions reversed "even if no particular
prejudice has been alleged, when defendant's counsel on appeal
is a different person from trial counsel and a portion of the tran-
script is unavailable." 0
Louisiana appellate courts have repeatedly reversed crimi-
nal convictions when the record of proceedings below is incom-
plete and thus impedes appellate review.15' "Without a complete
record from which a transcript for appeal may be prepared, a
defendant's right of appellate review is rendered meaning-
less."'' This reasoning is equally applicable in Washington
State. The Washington Supreme Court has, on one occasion,
reversed a conviction on the ground that loss of the court
reporter's notes prevented meaningful appellate review. 5 ' The
court did not mention article I, section 22 in its opinion, but
based its holding on the fact that appellate counsel was unable
to represent the defendant adequately without a complete tran-
script. This rationale accords with the views expressed by the
Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Ford: "[W]here a defen-
dant's attorney is unable, through no fault of his own, to review
512 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1975); Fowler v. United States, 310 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1962).
148. Ford, 338 So. 2d at 109 n.5.
149. Id. at 109 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 303 F.2d 165, 169 (4th Cir. 1962)).
150. Id. (citing United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 934 (1972); United States v. Garcia-Bonifascio, 443 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1971)).
See United States v. Atilus, 425 F.2d 816, 816 (5th Cir. 1970) ("[u]nder these circum-
stances the court has no choice but to reverse the conviction").
151. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 387 So. 2d 1143 (La. 1980) (court reporter's failure
to transcribe testimony of two expert witnesses prevents meaningful appellate review);
State v. Jones, 351 So. 2d 1194 (La. 1977) (tape recording malfunction prevents review of
denial of motion for change of venue); State v. Bizette, 334 So. 2d 392 (La. 1976) (tape
recording malfunction prevents review of trial court denial of motion for acquittal).
152. Ford, 338 So. 2d at 110 (emphasis added).
153. State v. Larson, 62 Wash. 2d 64, 381 P.2d 120 (1963).
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a substantial portion of the record for errors so that he may
properly perform his duty as appellate counsel, the interest of
justice requires that a defendant be afforded a new, fully
recorded trial.' ' 54
The mistakes of court reporters and clerks cannot be per-
mitted to defeat the defendant's constitutional right to an
appeal. Consequently, article I, section 22 requires an automatic
reversal and a new trial in those cases in which the record of
proceedings in the trial court has been lost or destroyed through
no fault of the defendant.
VI. CHILLING THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL BY
IMPOSING HARSHER SENTENCES AT RETRIAL
Under some limited circumstances, the United States
Supreme Court has held that a defendant who wins an appeal
and is subsequently retried and reconvicted may be given a
harsher sentence than that which he received at his first trial. In
North Carolina v. Pearce,'5 5 the Court held that neither the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment nor the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment imposed a com-
plete prohibition against more severe sentences upon reconvic-
tion.'56 The Court held, however, that it would be a "flagrant
violation" of the fourteenth amendment due process clause for
trial court judges to impose heavier sentences upon reconvicted
defendants "for the explicit purpose of punishing the defendant
for having succeeded in getting his original conviction set
aside." 5 '
The Pearce Court also recognized that a defendant's subjec-
tive fear of an increased sentence at retrial might "unconstitu-
tionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or
collaterally attack his first conviction.' 8 Thus, even in the
absence of actual vindictiveness in sentencing, "due process also
requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a
154. Ford, 338 So. 2d at 110.
155. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
156. Id. at 723.
157. Id. at 723-24. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) (limiting
death penalty to those defendants who plead not guilty violates due process); State v.
Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d 469, 479, 627 P.2d 922, 927 (1981) (holding invalid prior death
penalty statutes because they "needlessly chill a defendant's constitutional rights to
plead not guilty and demand a jury trial and violate due process").
158. 395 U.S. at 725.
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retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.' 159
Therefore, the Pearce Court held that in order to uphold an
increased sentence following a retrial, the sentencing judge must
have affirmatively stated on the record his reasons for increasing
the sentence, and those reasons must be based on objective
information concerning conduct of the defendant occurring since
the time of the original sentencing.'
Since Pearce was decided, however, a number of state
courts have found the due process safeguards adopted in Pearce
to be inadequate. Relying on state constitutional provisions,
these courts have adopted a per se rule that completely forbids
an increased sentence following a retrial. Some of these decisions
have been premised upon state constitutional double jeopardy
provisions, some upon state constitutional due process guaran-
tees, and a few courts have expressly grounded their decision on
the existence of a state constitutional right to appeal.' 6 '
The West Virginia Supreme Court perceived the key flaw in
the Pearce decision: it is impossible to prove whether the sen-
tencing judge was motivated to increase the original sentence by
a desire to retaliate against defendants who successfully
appeal.'62 The West Virginia Supreme Court imposed a rule of
total prohibition of increased sentences on the ground that the
Pearce Court's due process remedy was inevitably inadequate:
It is clear to us that when a defendant refuses to prosecute an
159. Id.
160. Id. at 726.
161. See, e.g., Shagloak v. State, 597 P.2d 142, 145 (Alaska 1979) (due process,
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7); People v. Serrato, 9 Cal. 3d 753, 764, 512 P.2d 289, 297, 109
Cal. Rptr. 65, 73 (1973) (post-Pearce .decision adhering to Henderson but creating excep-
tion for cases in which original sentence was illegal), overruled, People v. Fosselman, 33
Cal. 3d 572, 659 P.2d 1144, 189 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1983); People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d
482, 495-97, 386 P.2d 677, 685, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 85 (1963) (pre-Pearce decision based on
double jeopardy, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13) (superseded by statute as stated in People v.
Sanders, 154 Cal. App. 3d 487, 201 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1984)); State v. Washington, 380 So.
2d 64, 65 (La. 1980) (state constitutional right to appeal, LA. CONST. art. I, § 16); State v.
Wolf, 46 N.J. 301, 309, 216 A.2d 586, 590 (1966) (premised upon statutory right to appeal
and "standards of procedural fairness"); Commonwealth v. Story, 497 Pa. 273, 281-82,
440 A.2d 488, 492 (1981) (post-Pearce decision based on statutory right to appeal); Com-
monwealth v. Littlejohn, 433 Pa. 336, 341-48, 250 A.2d 811, 813-15 (1969) (pre-Pearce
decision based on statutory right to appeal, federal due process, federal equal protection,
federal double jeopardy); State v. Eden, 256 S.E.2d 868, 875 n.14 (W. Va. 1979) (state
constitutional right to appeal, W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 10). See also Roberson v. State,
258 So. 2d 257, 261 nn.1-2 (Fla.) (Drew, J., concurring) (state constitutional right to
appeal, FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 5(3), 4(2)), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972).
162. State v. Eden, 256 S.E.2d 868, 874 (W. Va. 1979).
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appeal to which he is entitled by law for fear he will receive a
heavier sentence on retrial, he has been denied his right to
appeal. The decision not to appeal is the defendant's but the
necessity of making the decision is forced on him by the State.
The State is in effect imposing conditions upon the defendant's
right to appeal by telling him that he has the right, but that by
exercising it he risks a harsher sentence.
Limiting increased sentencing to those situations where
the defendant's conduct after the time of the original sentenc-
ing arguably supports the increase reduces the possibility of
vindictive motivation and the apprehension of punishment but
it does not relieve it altogether. The State is still imposing a
condition on the defendant's right to appeal in violation of due
process, and the apprehension of punishment for taking an
appeal is still lodged in the defendant's mind. Increased sen-
tencing upon reconviction after successful prosecution of an
appeal inherently gives rise to a fear of harsher penalties and
retribution which burdens or chills the defendant's right to
appeal and should not be permitted in any circumstances.1 3
Lest anyone wonder whether there truly is a danger of chil-
ling the exercise of the right to appeal by permitting increased
penalties upon reconviction, he should examine the following
letter from a prisoner received by a North Carolina trial judge:
Dear Sir:
I am in the Mecklenburg County jail. Mr. - chose to
retry me as I knew he would ....
Sir, the other defendant in this case was set free after serv-
ing 15 months of his sentence. I have served 34 months and
now I am to be tried again and with all probility [sic] I will
receive a heavier sentence then [sic] before as you know sir
my sentence at the first trite [sic] was 20 to 30 years. I know it
is usuelly [sic] the courts [sic] prosedure [sic] to give a larger
sentence when a new trite [sic] is granted I guess this is to
discourage Petitioners.
Your Honor I don't want a new trite [sic] I am afraid of
more time ....
Your Honor, I know you have tried to help me and God
knows I apreceate [sic] this but please sir don't let the state
retry me if there is any way you can prevent it.
Very truly yours." 4
163. Id. at 875.
164. Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225, 231 n.7 (W.D.N.C. 1966) (emphasis
in original), aff'd, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968).
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The Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania6 5 and West Vir-
ginia 166 have noted that the American Bar Association Criminal
Justice Standards recommended that a sentencing judge "should
not be empowered to impose a more severe penalty than that
originally imposed.' 6 7 The ABA Advisory Committee rejected
the idea that a trial judge should be allowed to increase the orig-
inal sentence based upon additional information not available to
the original sentencing judge:
Even though new facts may be brought to light which might
occasionally warrant a heavier sentence, the Advisory Commit-
tee believes it is preferable to establish a standard that is pro-
phylactic in effect and easily administered, whereby sentencing
judges are not given the power to increase a sentence when an
appellant has exercised his right to seek a post conviction
remedy. 68
Finally, some courts have recognized that a per se prophy-
lactic rule enables appellate courts to avoid "the unpleasant task
of assessing a trial court's sincerity" when the defendant claims
that the increased sentence was motivated by a retaliatory desire
to punish him for appealing his first conviction, and the state
responds that the increased sentence was properly motivated by
additional information regarding the defendant's conduct. 6 9 On
this basis, the Supreme Courts of Oregon 70 and Minnesota' 7 '
have barred increased sentences on grounds of judicial policy,
rather than upon constitutional grounds.
The arguments against allowing increased sentences follow-
ing retrial are most compelling in Washington State, where the
defendant's right to appeal is of constitutional magnitude. 172
165. Commonwealth v. Littlejohn, 433 Pa. 336, 344, 250 A.2d 811, 815 (1969) (citing
STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES § 6.3(a) (Approved Draft 1968)).
166. State v. Eden, 256 S.E.2d 868, 875 (W. Va. 1979) (quoting STANDARDS RELATING
TO POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES § 6.3(a) (Approved Draft 1968)).
167. STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES § 6.3(a) (Approved Draft
1968).
168. STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES § 6.3(a) commentary at 96
(Approved Draft 1968).
169. State v. Holmes, 281 Minn. 294, 303, 161 N.W.2d 650, 656 (1968). See Patton v.
North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 641 (4th Cir. 1967) (court found that the task of scrutiniz-
ing the motives of the sentencing judge was "most distasteful").
170. State v. Turner, 247 Or. 301, 315, 429 P.2d 565, 571 (1967).
171. State v. Holmes, 281 Minn. 294, 296, 161 N.W.2d 650, 652 (1968).
172. In State v. Hughes and State v. Ng, the appellants filed a motion in the Wash-
ington Supreme Court seeking an advance ruling that the prosecution would not be
allowed to ask for the death penalty at a retrial if the defendants obtained reversals of
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Here, as in West Virginia and Louisiana, increased sentences
after retrial would "impair to an appreciable extent the policies
underlying the constitutional right to appeal."' 7 3 The prosecu-
tion has no valid interest in deterring defendants from exercis-
ing their article I, section 22 right to meaningful appellate
review. The essential function of an appeal is to minimize the
risk of erroneously punishing the innocent. This function is
undercut by sentencing procedures that induce potentially inno-
cent defendants to forfeit their right to appeal for fear of
retaliation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The decision of the framers of the Washington Constitution
to constitutionalize a criminal defendant's right to an appeal
marked a distinct and radical break with the common-law past.
As the first state in the Union to recognize a fundamental right
to meaningful appellate review, Washington occupies a unique
historical position. It would contravene the intent of the framers
to permit this constitutional right to an appeal to be eroded,
diluted, or restricted by policy considerations unrelated to the
their aggravated first degree murder convictions. In both cases the defendants had
received sentences of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Ng and Hughes
contended that it would violate their constitutional right to appeal, as well as their
double jeopardy and due process rights, if the state were to be permitted to seek a har-
sher sentence (death) at retrial than the sentence they received at their first trial.
Following full briefing, the defendants' motions were set for oral argument before
the Washington Supreme Court. However, at the eleventh hour the prosecution agreed
to stipulate that:
it will not file Notice of Special Sentencing Proceeding, required pursuant to
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.040 when the prosecutor requests the death penalty
as punishment, in any subsequent retrial of the above entitled cases, nor will
the state in any other way seek a new sentencing hearing in these cases to
determine whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.
In return, the defendants moved to dismiss their consolidated motions seeking an
advance ruling on the state's right to seek the death penalty in future proceedings. The
Washington Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the defendants' motion and entered
an order stating that "the maximum sentence which may be imposed upon Robert
Wayne Hughes or Benjamin Kin Ng in any subsequent proceedings in the cases before
the Court is life imprisonment without possibility of release or parole." (Order on
Motions, dated June 4, 1984, Chief Justice William H. Williams).
Copies of the briefs in support of the defendants' motions may be obtained from
defendants' appellate counsel, Paris Kallas and Nancy Talner of the Washington Appel-
late Defender Association, 812 Smith Tower, Seattle, WA 98104, and David Wohl, 650
Colman Building, Seattle, WA 98104.
173. State v. Eden, 256 S.E.2d 868, 875 (W. Va. 1979); State v. Washington, 380 So.
2d 64, 67 (La. 1980).
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goal of ensuring against the erroneous conviction of innocent
defendants.
To preserve the right to appeal as a fundamental safeguard
against injustice, we must resist the natural tendency to reduce
the workload of the appellate courts by casually dismissing the
untimely appeal, or the appeal of the escaped convict. Neither
the negligence of counsel nor the commission of the crime of
escape by the defendant can justify the dismissal of a criminal
appeal. Similarly, we must resist the temptation to reduce or
eliminate the time allotted for oral argument. Finally, we must
prevent defendants from being deterred from exercising their
right to appeal for fear that they will receive a harsher sentence
if reconvicted, as a penalty for having successfully appealed
their first conviction.
The Washington Constitution specifically instructs us that"a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to
the security of individual right and the perpetuity of free gov-
ernment. ' 17 4 One of the fundamental principles is, as Justice
Harlan observed, "the determination in our society that it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go
free."' 5 The right to appellate review guaranteed by article I,
section 22 is designed to implement that principle.
174. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 32.
175. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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